Case Title and
Citation: Washington
Shoe v. A-Z Sporting Goods, Case Nos. 11-35166 and 11-35206
Court: United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Document status: Judgment
of the district court is reversed and remanded.
Issue or relevant
point: Whether or not Defendant-Appellee, an Arkansas corporation is
subject to personal jurisdiction for willful copyright infringement in Washington?
Ruling: The Court of Appeals reversed the district
court dismissal of the copyright infringement claim on the ground of lack of
personal jurisdiction.
Summary
Plaintiff-Appellant Washington Shoe is a Washington
corporation doing a business in manufacturing and selling shoes in the state of
Washington for over 100 years. Defendant-Appellee
A-Z is an Arkansas corporation that sells goods relating to hunting, fishing,
and outdoor activities. A-Z purchased
shoes from Washington Shoe for a few years, and A-Z through a Washington
salesman representative was also provided with brochures and catalogs containing
other Washington Shoe products and copyright notifications.
In 2009, Washington Shoe discovered that two
of its copyrighted children boots were displayed and sold in A-Z’s store
without permission. A-Z admitted that
the boots were purchased from China and not from Washington Shoe. A-Z also argued that the boots had no name on
them or other indication that they were subject to copyright.
Washington Shoe sent a cease-and-desist letter to A-Z,
informing A-Z that the boots in dispute were copyrighted. A-Z was also advised to stop selling the
boots, and was asked for an accounting of past sales. A second cease-and-desist letter was also
sent, informing A-Z that its acts constituted violation of Washington Shoe’s
copyright, and that it may be held liable for actual or statutory damages. Although A-Z then stopped selling the boots
from its store, the remaining inventory was sold to a thrift store.
Washington Shoe filed a complaint against A-Z in the U.S.
District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging copyright
infringement. A-Z filed a motion to
dismiss on the grounds of lack of personal jurisdiction, and forum non
conveniens. The court granted A-Z’s
motion to dismiss, but denied its request for attorneys’ fees. Washington Shoe appealed the decision on the
dismissal.
The Ninth Circuit court employed the three-part due process
test to determine whether A-Z, a non-resident defendant, had sufficient minimum
contacts with the Washington state to be subject to jurisdiction in the
Washington federal court. The test to
determine whether a non-resident defendant was subject to the courts personal
jurisdiction encompassed the following:
1) The non-resident defendant must purposefully direct his activities or consummate
some transaction with the forum or resident thereof; or perform some act by which
he purposefully avails itself of the privilege
of conducting activities in the forum, thereby invoking the benefits and
protections of its laws;
2) the claim must be one which arises out of or
relates to the defendant’s forum-related activities; and
3) the exercise of jurisdiction must comport with
fair play and substantial justice (i.e., it must be reasonable).
The Court viewed the first prong as the only issue in this
case. The Ninth Circuit analyzed whether
A-Z had: (1) committed an intentional
act, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, and (3) that caused harm that the
defendant knows is likely to be suffered in the forum state.
First, the appellate court found that A-Z’s conduct
constituted an intentional act of copyright infringement, because A-Z admitted
that the boots in dispute were bought from China, and not from Washington Shoe,
and were displayed and sold to its retail store, and sold to the thrift store
after receiving cease-and-desist letters. The Court concluded that A-Z has
committed an intentional act pursuant
to the Calder test.
Second, the Court noted A-Z had been buying shoes from
Washington Shoe for years, and was aware that the infringing boots are owned
and copyrighted under Washington Shoe.
It elaborated that the “express aiming” requirement is satisfied, and
specific jurisdiction exists, “when ‘the defendant is alleged to have engaged
in wrongful conduct targeted at a plaintiff whom the defendant knows to be a resident
of the forum state.’”[1]
Finally, the court determined that A-Z’s intentional act of
infringement could result in an economic loss both in Arkansas where the
infringing act took place, and in Washington where the copyright holder has its
principal place of business. A-Z was
aware that the impact of its willful infringement was likely to be suffered in
Washington.
Conclusion
Particularly in a pre-trial phase, the doctrine of a
long-arm statute of the State extends jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant
if the defendant: 1) willfully violates a copyright [intentional act], 2) purposefully
directed its related activities at the forum state [expressly aimed], and 3)
knows harm from its intentional act would likely be suffered in the forum state
[knowing harm].
[1] See Dole Food Co. v. Watts, 303 F.3d
1104, 1111 (9th Cir. 2002) (quoting Bancroft & Masters, 223 F.3d at 1087)